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We consider a situation where groups negotiate over the allocation
of a surplus (which is used to fund group specic goods). Each group
is composed of agents who have diering valuations for public goods.
Members choose a representative to take decisions on their behalf.
Specically, representatives can decide to enter either a (cooperative)
negotiation protocol or a con
ict to appropriate the surplus. In the
cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata al-
location (as a function of the size of the groups). We analyse the
conditions (on the internal composition of the groups) under which
con
ict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa),
and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we provide results of com-
parative statics that highlight the in
uence of changes in the internal




JEL codes: C78, D74, J52.
1 Introduction
The issue of the prevalence of negotiated agreements over con
ict has received
a lot of attention in the recent decades. Even though the use of con
ict is
typically inecient as it implies some waste of resources (a social cost), con-

ictual situations are widely observed in practice. More specically, there are
situations where two options exist: parties can decide to enter a negotiation
I am grateful to Santiago Sanchez-Pages and to participants at the CTN work-
shop in Marseille for helpful comments. Address: Queen's University Management
School, Queen's University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN (UK). E-mail:
n.querou@qub.ac.uk.; Phone number: +44 (0)28 9097 3281.
1protocol or a con
ictual process. There are plenty of relevant examples that
are consistent with such a situation.
In national sport leagues (US basketball, hockey as examples) collective bar-
gaining agreements are basic contracts between the National League team
owners and the Players Association. They are designed to be arrived at
through the typical labour-management negotiations of collective bargaining.
Regarding the National Hockey league, one of the most recent agreements
was reached on July 2005 after a labor dispute which caused the cancellation
of the 2004-2005 season. The contract was eventually ratied by the NHLPA
membership and by the league's Board of Governors. In this example there
are two groups, the team owners and the Players association. Even though
negotiations resumed on July 2005, one could understand the nal contract
mainly as an outcome of a con
ictual process between the two groups. More-
over this was obviously a con
ict where both sides exerted costly eorts in
order to in
uence the outcome.
Another relevant case is the problem of natural resource management. There
are numerous examples of problems at the national or international level
highlighting that parties sometimes decide to either follow a negotiation pro-
tocol or enter a con
ict in order to lobby to in
uence the allocation process.
For instance, in problems of sheries management, quotas may result from
international (this is currently a main issue in the European Union) or from
local processes (involving cooperatives formed by shermen, groups of en-
vironmentalists and local authorities). Parties have typically two types of
choice at the beginning: entering a negotiation process or refusing to seat at
the negotiation table and lobbying to in
uence the nal outcome.
There are obviously other types of situation (collective bargaining/strikes,
healthcare contracts,..) that would be consistent with the above description.
In such situations, a negotiated agreement is socially preferable but groups
can still decide to enter con
ict. That is why it is important to understand
the conditions under which groups will decide to enter one type of process
(cooperative or con
ictual) or the other.
The existing literature has mostly focused on situations where individuals
are involved in the process, or where groups are uniform with respect to
their members' individual preferences. In the present paper we consider a
situation where two groups are involved in the process. A surplus has to
be allocated either via a negotiated agreement, which is modeled by using
the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)), or by using con
ict (which is
2modeled by a costly contest as dened by Tullock (1980), and analysed in
Hirshleifer (1989) or Skaperdas (1992)). Con
ict will prevail if one group
is willing to use it, while negotiation requires mutual consent. Members of
a given group have diering valuations (either high or low) for the surplus.
Each group chooses a representative who is given the authority to either ne-
gotiate cooperatively or to decide to engage the group in con
ict. If con
ict
occurs then each group's member follows their leader's decision and individ-
ually decides how much eort to exert. We would like to stress that con
ict
should be understood in a quite wide perspective. Con
ict should not be
simply understood as military, but rather as a metaphore for unproductive
and costly activities focused on the appropriation of the surplus (costly liti-
gation, lobbying activities, strikes).
We provide conditions (linking individuals' characteristics with the inter-
nal structure and the relative size of each group) under which groups will
decide to enter a negotiation protocol rather than a con
ictual process (and
vice versa). Specically, the main conclusions are:
 There are cases where con
ict is more likely to occur when groups have
the same size;
 The emergence of negotiated agreements or con
ict depends on the
ratio of the valuations of members who value the most the surplus in
both groups (that is, the high type members in both groups);
 When this ratio is suciently low (for one of the groups), a negotiated
agreement is not sustainable;
 The situation is more complex when this ratio has moderate or large
values. Whether cooperative bargaining is optimal or not depends qual-
itatively on structural conditions linking the internal composition of
each group (whether members with high valuations of the surplus con-
stitute the majority) with their relative size.
We conclude the analysis by providing results of comparative statics that
highlight the in
uence of variations of the internal composition of each group
on the range of situations for which negotiated agreements will prevail, and
by deriving some implications regarding the structure of groups.
Our contribution can be related to two types of contribution. First, the
present paper focuses on a problem of bargaining between groups. As in
3most of this literature we make the assumption that, once the representa-
tive is chosen for each group, his preferences become those of the group.1
However, the topic of this paper is quite dierent from most of the contri-
butions on group bargaining that focus on non cooperative approaches (see
Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Jun (1989), or Cai (2000)). Unlike these papers,
we focus here on the conditions (regarding the groups' characteristics) under
which negotiated agreements or con
ict will emerge as equilibrium outcomes.
Haller and Holden (1997) use the Nash bargaining solution and analyse the
interplay between ratication requirement and a group's bargaining power.
Again their perspective is quite dierent from the main points of the present
analysis.
Secondly, this paper is related to the literature on negotiations and con-

ict. Various issues have been analysed so far. Anbarci et al. (2002) provide
a comparison of several bargaining solutions (in terms of their relative e-
ciency) under the shadow of con
ict. Baliga and Sjostrom (2004) consider
a situation where two agents simultaneously decide whether or not to go to
war, and they highlight the potential benet of cheap talk to maintain coop-
eration. Jackson and Morelli (2007) analyse a model where decision makers
or two countries can either go to war or avoid it (by negotiating transfers),
and they show how the incentives to rely on con
ict depend on the decision
makers' risk/reward ratio from a war. Ellingsen and Miettinen (2008) (pur-
suing the line of research initiated by Schelling (1956, 1963) and later on
by Crawford (1982)) analyse a Nash demand game where negotiators might
adopt dierent types of commitments. They show that, when commitment
technologies are highly credible, and there is a small (vanishing) cost of com-
mitment, there is a unique equilibrium where demands are incompatible.
Sanchez-Pages (2009) analyse a one-sided incomplete information bargain-
ing model where the game ends with an agreement or an absolute con
ict.
However agents can opt for another option (limited con
ict) in order to get
information about the outcome of the absolute con
ict. It is shown that war
may have positive or negative eects on the whole process. Specically, it can
either create room for an agreement or lead to ineciencies while bargaining
is a feasible option.
1Notable exceptions are Ponsati and Sakovics (1996), who analyse how dierent pref-
erence aggregation protocols aect the bargaining outcomes, and Manzini and Mariotti
(2005), who highlight the in
uence of dierential information between members on the
alliance behavior. By contrast the present paper focuses on the optimality of cooperative
or con
ictual behavior. It is assumed that each group uses majority voting, as this is the
most widely used protocol.
4We focus on understanding the reasons for the emergence of con
ict or negoti-
ated agreements as equilibrium outcomes. As such the present paper departs
substantively from papers which focus on the analysis of how the shadow of
con
ict in
uences the nature of negotiated agreements (as in Anbarci et al.
(2002)). In these papers agents anticipate the costs resulting from con
ict.
As a result they always agree on a negotiated agreement. By contrast we
analyse (as in Jackson and Morelli (2007, 2009)) the incentives of decision
makers to go to war or to rely on a negotiated agreement. We will show
(as they do) that there are cases where entering a negotiation protocal or a
costly con
ict might become optimal. The main dierence is that we allow
explicitly for heterogeneous populations within each group (members with
diering preferences), and we will show that the decision to enter negotia-
tions or con
ict depends on conditions that relate individuals' characteristics
(members' valuations of the surplus) to group characteristics (internal com-
position, relative size). As such the present contribution complements those
of the above papers by analysing the in
uence of collective characteristics on
the emergence of one pattern of behavior at the equilibrium. Moreover, it
extends the growing literature analysing the in
uence of collective structures
on economic activities (see Brandts et al. (2009) for such a study in the
context of rent seeking activities).
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2.
The payos resulting from cooperative bargaining and con
ict are analysed
in section 3. The full characterization of the equilibrium set and results of
comparative statics are provided in section 4. The case where both groups
have the same size and the general case are provided. Section 5 concludes.
Some proofs are relegated in an appendix in section 6.
2 The model
2.1 Description of the situation
We consider a situation where a surplus  has to be allocated between two
groups G1 and G2 (of respective sizes n and m). The allocation process can
be specied as follows. First, each group chooses a representative who has
full authority during the allocation process. Specically, it is assumed that
the members of a group are fully committed to the decision taken by their
representative. Representatives are chosen by simple majority within each
5group.2 Members choose the representative such that the payo resulting
from this choice is maximal.
Second, the process enters the allocation stage. The representatives can
either negotiate cooperatively (using the Nash bargaining solution) or they
can decide that the groups will enter a con
ict over the appropriation of the
surplus. While cooperative negotiations require the consent of both parties,
con
ict will occur if only one representative is willing to use it. The surplus
is allocated either by cooperative bargaining or the outcome of the costly
contest (following recent contributions on the analysis of con
ict, see Este-
ban and Ray (2008) among other examples). We will be more specic about
the modeling of benets and costs in the next section.
The share of the surplus secured is then used to fund group specic goods.
More specically, the problem analysed here focuses on situations where the
outcome of the allocation process (shares of surplus for both parties) is char-
acterized by rivalry in consumption and excludability at the inter-group level,
but is non rival in consumption and non excludable at the intra-group level.
This assumption is met in social settings where all members of a given group
benet from the share of the surplus secured. For instance, interest groups
might negotiate or lobby to in
uence the allocation process; all members
of one group benet from the outcome. Unions and senior managers might
bargain over wage increases or use con
ict to force the decision. Wage in-
creases benet all workers: in case of con
ict, they benet both strikers and
non strikers. From now on, thinking about groups as communities, we will
assume that the surplus secured by each group is spent on (strictly) local
public goods.
Members of each group have two possible types. They have either low or
high valuation for local public goods. Specically, let i
H (respectively, i
L)
denote the valuation of members of group i that are high type. The valu-
ation of low type members in group i is denoted by i
L. It is assumed that
i
H > i
L for each group i. Their internal composition is dened by a param-
eter ni (i = 1;2), which denotes the number of high type members of group i.
At this stage of the description we would like to stress one important re-
mark regarding the above process. During the second stage representatives
can either choose to use a negotiation process or a con
ict. In other words
2It is implicitly assumed that there is one candidate from each sub-population of agents
in each group.
6it is assumed that representatives have two possible choices: to go to or to
avoid war. If both representatives decide to avoid war then this corresponds
to a situation wheere they can sign some enforceable treaty so that they do
not go to war provided that a mutuallly suitable allocation is chosen via ne-
gotiations. Even though we model negotiations as a cooperative bargaining
process by using the Nash bargaining solution, we have to dene what are
usually called the threat points or disagreement payos. These would corre-
spond to perpetual disagreement during negotiations. In the present case we
assume a proportional situation, that is, we assume that the disagreement








where dis is the disagreement surplus, which is smaller than the surplus
 both groups can secure by negotiating successfully. In other words, it is
assumed that, if both groups decide to avoid war but are yet not able to
agree on a division of the surplus then they receive a share of the surplus
according to a pro rata rule (or any division that is increasing in the relative
size of a group). This implicitly assumes some sort of proportional represen-
tation, which makes sense when the surplus to be allocated is used for public
spendings on (local) public goods. In such situations the pro rata allocation
rule can be thought about as some sort of status quo allocation rule in case
both parties agree to negotiate. In local funding related issues (healthcare
for instance), it makes sense to use the relative population size to determine
the status quo allocation rule.
2.2 Discussion of the assumptions
There are several features of the above model that deserve further comment.
First, the above specication might correspond to a situation where there is
a third party, which is acknowledged informally by both groups as having
some ability to intervene in case a negotiation process is chosen but fails to
provide an agreement. At the same time, this third party does not have any
formal authority, which means that both groups can decide to go to war if
they are willing to do so. With such an interpretation in mind, the question
would become: If groups can either delegate their authority to a regulator
(whose principles of distributive justice correspond to the Nash bargaining
solution) or remain uncommitted and appropriate the surplus by con
ict,
7what is the in
uence of collective characteristics on the emergence of a so-
cial contract or con
ict as an equilibrium outcome? It is important to notice
that this third party would never intervene actually, since a mutually suitable
(ecient) agreement would always result when both countries are willing to
rely on a negotiation process.
Secondly, there is an important assumption about the payos of the groups
corresponding to the situation where they agree to commit to the negotiation
protocol but would fail to reach an agreement. Specically, the disagreement
payos corresponding to the negotiation process do not (necessarily) corre-
spond to the payos resulting from con
ict. Why is it so? The main starting
point is that disagreement is not equivalent to con
ict in the present setting.
From a general point of view, there are many situations where agents could
disagree on an issue but would not enter an open con
ict since the latter
could be very destructive. The present model would thus refer to situations
where group representatives understand that there are circumstances where
it is preferable to avoid war, even though negotiations do not necessarily lead
to an (ecient) agreement. Another potential interpretation exists if one re-
lies on the idea that the Nash bargaining solution would correspond to the
principles of distributive justice of a regulator. In such a case the specics
of negotiations would rely on this regulator's principles, and the denition of
the disagreement points would depend on his specication of the protocol.
It could well be the case that the regulator would dene what happens in
case of disagreement during negotiations by relying on his knowledge about
the characteristics of the groups. The relative size of the groups would then
be a reasonably natural criterion. With this perspective in mind, the group
representatives could decide to use con
ict if they reject the course of action
specied by the social contract oered by the regulator.
There is a nal comment to be made. As explained above the specica-
tion of the disagreement payos adopted in the present setting seems to be
reasonable and to make sense in certain situations, but one might argue that
it could be the outcome of some endogenous process too. A rst possibil-
ity would be to assume that it would follow from the agents' anticipation
of (future) costs of con
ict. In this case the situation would correspond to
a problem under the shadow of con
ict. This is not the kind of situation
we want to analyse, as it takes the fact that both parties would seat at the
negotiation table as granted. Moreover the usual conclusion is that con
ict
never occurs in such problems. We would like to stress that the main pur-
pose of the present analysis is rather to understand the structural conditions
(on collective characteristics) that would explain the emergence of either ne-
8gotiated agreements or con
ict. We want to understand why it is the case
that agents might decide to seat at the negotiation table or refuse to do so.
As such we do consider a setting where the options to negotiate and to use
con
ict are simultaneous rather than sequential.
A second possibility would be to consider a dynamic problem where both
parties would have the opportunity to use either pattern of behavior at each
period. This would allow for an endogenous denition of the disagreement
payos corresponding to the option to negotiate. In such a situation the
analysis of conditions under which one pattern of behavior or the other will
dominate would be clearly interesting. However a rst problem would be to
analyse if there are conditions that could explain the existence of con
ict.
We want to focus on the in
uence of collective characteristics in the present
setting. That is why we consider the present framework as appropriate since
it enables us to focus specically on this problem. Nonetheless, extending
the present work to a dynamic setting is obviously an important point for
future research.
2.3 Timing of the game and nal remarks
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. First, a representative
is chosen by the members of a group.3 Members choose a representative ac-
cording to the (expected) payo that will result from this choice. Secondly,
the representatives of both groups decide whether they will negotiate coop-
eratively or they will ght over the appropriation of the surplus. Thirdly, the
allocation is the Nash bargaining solution (where the disagreement point is
dened by using a pro rata allocation rule), or the outcome of a costly con-
test. Finally, the resulting allocation is used to provide local public goods
which are group specic.
Before concluding this section, let us be slightly more specic about the
choice of the representatives. In the analysis there will be several instances
where the equilibria of the overall game will not depend on the choice of the
representative. In some other cases they will only depend on which type of
agents constitutes the majority in the group considered. This depends on
the following fact. The problem is similar to a voting process where there
are only two alternatives, namely negotiating or using con
ict. This implies
that there is no dierence (concerning the equilibrium outcomes) between
3The specic voting process that is used does not really matter, as it will become
obvious in the analysis. As said previously, we will consider that the representative is
chosen by simple majority.
9the cases where agents use sincere or strategic voting to choose their rep-
resentative in the present setting. Indeed there will be two options: either
one pattern of behavior is clearly optimal for both types of members (in a
given group), and the choice of the representative does not matter; or the
preferred option diers within the group, which means that the agents' type
which constitutes the majority will rule the election process. In the analysis
we will not make a distinction between sincere and strategic voting, and we
will mainly characterize the equilibrium outcomes (emergence of negotiated
agreements or con
ict).
In the next section we will solve the above game. Specically, we will solve
for the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the four stage game, and we
will analyse the conditions under which negotiated agreements (or con
ict)
will prevail at the equilibrium.
3 Preliminaries: The contest and the coop-
erative bargaining games
As usual when dealing with subgame perfect equilibria, we will use backward
induction arguments to analyse the model. In the present section we analyse
the last stage of the process. We rst derive the payos of each type of mem-
bers in a given group when groups are involved in con
ict or in cooperative
bargaining.
3.1 The contest game
If at least one representative has decided to use con
ict as a way to appro-
priate the surplus, then a contest game occurs. As explained in the previous
section, a representative has full authority over the decision to rely on bar-
gaining or con
ict. This means that all members of the group are committed
to follow his decision. This has the following implication in the contest
game. All members of a group are assumed to exert (costly) eorts to in
u-
ence the overall probability of appropriating the surplus. We use a form of
group contest success function that has been recently axiomatized (Munster
(2009)). Specically, if e
j
i denotes the eort exerted by member i of group j,











k, where j = 1;2 respectively. If no member exerts eort,
then each group has probability 1
2 of appropriating the surplus. If group j
does not win, it gets a zero payo.
10Concerning the equilibrium denition used in the contest game, we follow
Esteban and Ray (2007). Specically, an equilibrium in the contest game





group j = 1;2 (where jG1j = n and jG2j = m) such that, for any j = 1;2






























where  j 6= j, and k = L;H denotes the type of member i of group j. In
other words, member i of group j exerts the level of eort that maximizes his
expected payo in the contest, assuming that all other agents (other mem-
bers of the same group, and members of the opposing group) exert their
equilibrium level of eort.
We need several steps to derive the solution of this stage of the game. First,
each group has incentives to exert a positive level of (aggregated) eort at
the equilibrium. Indeed, if it is not the case then each group has the same
chance to appropriate the surplus. It is straightforward to check that any
member has incentives to increase his eort (assuming that all other agents
exert no eort) by a small amount, as this increases the probability that his
group wins the contest from 1
2 to 1.
A second point is that we will focus on symmetric equilibrium. Specif-
ically, we will focus on equilibria where, for a given group, members of
the same type exert the same level of eort. This implies that such an









L) (for group 2) where the n1 (respectively, n2) rst terms
of the rst (respectively, second) vector refer to the level of contribution of
high type members of group 1 (respectively, of group 2), and the remaining
terms to the level of contribution of low type members of group 1 (respec-
tively, of group 2).
The next step is to consider the possible types of symmetric equilibrium.
They can be described as follows (focusing on group 1):
1. e1
H > 0 and e1
L > 0
2. e1
H > 0 and e1
L = 0
3. e1
H = 0 and e1
L > 0
114. e1
H = 0 = e1
L.
Case 4 has already been ruled out by the argument presented in the rst
point discussed above.
Let us focus on the rst case. If such a case is valid, then the equilibrium
levels of eort satisfy the following rst order conditions (that are necessary
and sucient from (strict) concavity of expected payos (1)):
n2e2
H + (m   n2)e2
L
[(n1   1)e1
H + (n   n1)e1
L + n2e2




for a high type member of group 1, and
n2e2
H + (m   n2)e2
L
[n1e1
H + (n   n1   1)e1
L + n2e2




for a low type member of group 1. Because 1
H 6= 1
L a simple inspection of
the above two rst order conditions leads to the conclusion that they cannot
be satised simultaneously. This rules out case 1.
This conclusion deserves further comment. It implies that intra group equi-
librium levels of eort are characterized as follows. One type of members
exert positive levels of eort while members from the other type do not con-
tribute (they free ride on the eorts of others). This implication relies on the
specic form of the rent seeking functions used in (1). With functions where
the rent seeking technology is more general (for instance, with convex costs
of eort) all members will exert positive levels of eort, but the members
who previously did not contribute will still free ride on the eorts of others,
that is, they will still exert a lower level of eort. This is intuitively perfectly
consistent with the kind of situations we consider. Let us consider the exam-
ple of union - management relationships as an illustrative example. If wage
increases are the outcome of a con
ict, they benet both stricking and non
stricking workers. As such workers have incentives to free ride and to not
participate in strike. This is the exact meaning of the above conclusion. We
will keep the above form of rent seeking technology as this will enable us to
present results in the simplest possible form.
Let us come back to the analysis. We now analyse the conditions under
which the equilibrium levels of eort could correspond to either case 2 or






12Then this is equivalent to assuming that the expected payo of low type
member of group 1 is a decreasing function of his own level of eort. Thus,
dierentiating expression (1) with respect to e1
L, we have:
n2e2
H + (m   n2)e2
L
[n1e1
H + (n   n1)e1
L + n2e2




Moreover, assuming positive levels of eort for high type members of group
1, e1
H is then characterized by the following condition:
n2e2
H + (m   n2)e2
L
[n1e1
H + (n   n1)e1
L + n2e2




Combining the above two conditions, we obtain that
[n2e
2

















which is always satised. Thus case 3 is never valid at the equilibrium.
Now we are in a position that enables us to characterize the optimal lev-
els of eort. We know that necessarily e1
L = e2
L = 0 at the equilibrium.
Moreover, (e1
H;e2
H) is the solution to the system dened by the following














































13We nally obtain the following expression of the expected payo of a high



























To understand the dierence between these two expressions, one needs to
keep in mind that low type members do not exert eort at the equilibrium.
Thus, they do not bear the burden of con
ict.
We conclude the section by summing up their main ndings.
Proposition 3.1. If con
ict occurs at the nal stage of the game, then a high



































In the next section we will analyse the outcome of the game at the nal
stage if representatives decide to allocate the surplus by using a negotiated
arrangement.
3.2 The cooperative bargaining game
If both representatives decide to choose a negotiated arrangement, then the
allocation corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution. To dene the solu-
tion we need to specify the disagreement point, that is, the allocation that
results from (perpetual) disagreement.
First, it is assumed that the disagreement surplus is dis < , that is, the
14surplus shrinks down in case of disagreement. This might correspond to a
situation where groups are allocated funding by local authorities. To provide
incentives to reach an agreement the surplus available is larger if the two
communities agree on an allocation than if they disagree perpetually.
Second, each representative obtains a share of the disagreement surplus that
is a function of the relative size of his own group. Again, this is an intuitive
assumption as there are several real life examples where communities are al-
located funding on the basis of their (relative) size.
Now we are in a position to derive the optimal allocation of the surplus
if representatives rely on a negotiated arrangement. Let us denote this al-
location by (;1   ) where  2 [0;1] denotes the share of the surplus



















where i;j = L;H denotes the type of the representative of group 1 (respec-
tively, group 2). It can be immediately checked that 0 <  < 1 because
of the specication of the disagreement point. Thus the optimal share is


















































We can now recap the main ndings of the present section as follows:
Proposition 3.2. Assume that representatives decide to rely on a negotiated
arrangement. Then the resulting payo for i type members of group 1 (where
















15Respectively, the payo for i type members of group 2 (where i = L;H) is
















Before concluding the present section let us make an additional comment.
The negotiated arrangement described in proposition 2.2 is ecient by de-
nition of the Nash bargaining solution. The allocation resulting from con
ict
is obviously inecient due to the social cost that is beared by both groups.
4 Characterization
Going backward, we now proceed with the analysis of the rst two stages of
the process. Specically, we will focus in the next section on the incentives
of each group to rely on con
ict or negotiations by analysing the delegation
problem, and we will characterize the equilibria of the full game. In this
section we will rst provide the analysis for the symmetric case, that is,
the situation where both groups have the same size (n = m), in order to
provide preliminary insights. We will then develop the full analysis of the
general case, which will enable us to highlight some qualitative dierences
between the symmetric and general cases. Finally, we will provide results
of comparative statics and some general implications resulting from these
results.
4.1 The symmetric case
4.1.1 Con
ict or negotiated agreement?
We now go one step backward and we analyse the incentives of each type of
member to opt for con
ict or negotiation. Again an important feature of the
model must be kept in mind. One can highlight it by focusing on the case of
the contest game.
If at least one representative decided to use con
ict, then we know (by propo-
sition 2.1) that low type members of each group will (to some extent) free
ride on the eorts of high type members. This does not depend on the iden-
tity of the representative of the group. There is however a main dierence
when a high type member represents the group and when this is not the
case. If such a member is the representative then he can decide to either
negotiate or ght, depending on what is optimal for him. If he is not, then
he cannot decide and must follow the leader's decision. In other words, one
16could expect strategic incentives from low type members to rely on con
ict
as they do not bear most of the burden resulting from con
ict. The analysis
that follows will highlight this point (among others), and will focus mainly
on the conditions (on the intra and inter group compositions, and on indi-
vidual characteristics as well) that guarantee that negotiated arrangements
will prevail over con
ict (and vice versa).
Let us now proceed with the analysis. The rst step is to understand the
conditions under which one allocation method prevails over the other. We
will focus on the case of group 1 for the exposition of the conditions (the case
of group 2 is symmetric). From proposition 2.2, we know that, provided the

















Now, if at least one representative is willing to use con
ict, using proposition



























Let us rst consider the case of a high type member. Using expressions
(2) and (3) and simplifying, we nd that whether con
ict is preferable than





























To highlight the main features of the analysis in a simple benchmark, we
focus rst on the case where the two groups have the same size, that is,






















































1 + (n1)2   1][ then high type members prefer con-









1 + (n1)2   1] then high type members are willing to
rely on negotiations.
The above properties highlight the way both the structure of group 1 (via






uence the protability of con
ict and negotiations for high
type members of group 1. This depends on how the valuation of high type
members of the other group compares with respect to their own valuation.
When 2
H is suciently large, then high type members of group 2 are more
willing to provide eorts during con
ict than similar members in group 1.
They realize that they will lose more by relying on con
ict than on negoti-
ations. When the comparison of the valuations is reversed then high type
members of group 1 have incentives to rely on an agressive strategy.
Let us now consider the case of low type members. Using expressions (2)
and (4) it is straightforward to conclude that con
ict is preferred to negoti-

















Now we are in a position to state the main result when groups have the same
size.
Proposition 4.1. Let us consider the case where groups have the same size,






















1 + (ni)2   1];1[, then high type members of group









 1, then all members of group i prefer a negotiated
arrangement.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The above proposition describes the situation when groups have the same
size. In this case the protability of con
ict over negotiation does not depend
on the relative size of the groups, but on a relationship between their inter-















the situation is simple as it corresponds to a case of common






then all members of group
i prefer an agressive strategy, while they unanimously prefer a negotiated
arrangement when this ratio becomes suciently large.
Second, there is internal disagreement over which strategy should be pre-
ferred for intermediate values of the ratio. In such cases members with a
high valuation would prefer negotiations, while members with a low valua-
tion would prefer an agressive strategy. This means that the choice of the
representative will depend on an additional parameter (compared to the cases
depicted previously), namely the type of agents who constitute the majority
within each group.
Let us proceed with the nal step of the analysis of the equilibrium. We
will provide conditions under which either con
ict or negotiation will pre-
vail by analysing the choice of the representatives for each group, taking the
choice of the other representative as given.
4.1.2 Characterization of the equilibrium set
Going one more step backward, we reach the rst stage of the game, namely
the choice of the representative. This choice will then determine whether
con
ict or negotiation will prevail at the equilibrium. This will enable us to
provide implications regarding the optimal structure of the groups, that is,
to assess the conditions (on the internal structure of each group and on their
relative size as well) that would ensure that negotiated arrangements prevail
at the equilibrium. Since con
ict yields a loss of the surplus, it is obvious
that negotiated arrangements are (socially) preferable.
19The nal part of the characterization of the equilibrium is relatively straight-
forward. Specically, we characterized in section 2.3 the optimal strategy for
each type of members within a single group. Now we need to derive the
implications of this characterization when the strategy of the two groups are
considered simultaneously.
Let us focus rst on the case of groups with the same size. Coming back









1 + (ni)2  1][, then we know that all members of group i prefer
con









which implies that all members of group j would prefer a negotiated arrange-
ment. Indeed, one can check immediately that
ni p
1 + (ni)2   1
> 1;
which leads to the above conclusion by using the third case in proposition
2.3 for group j. In such a situation it follows then that con
ict will be the
outcome of the game, and this is independent from the specic choice of










1 + (ni)2   1];1[, then we know that high type members
of group i are willing to rely on negotiations, while low type members prefer
con








1+(ni)2 1] then it follows
from the third case in proposition 2.3 that all members of group j would
prefer a negotiated arrangement. This has an important implication, namely
that the outcome of the game depends on the internal composition of group
i. Specically, if high type members constitute the majority, then we know
that a high type representative will be chosen in group i, who would be will-
ing to use a cooperative agreement. In such a case negotiation is favored by
both groups, and a negotiated arrangement will prevail. Now if high type
members are a minority in group i, then con
ict will be chosen by group i







 1, then all members of group i prefer a negotiated ar-






2]0;1] and this has two possible implications










1 + (nj)2   1][ and we conclude that all members











1 + (nj)2   1];1] and then high type members of group
j are willing to rely on negotiations, while low type members prefer
con
ict.
In the rst sub case we can conclude that con
ict will be the outcome of
the game, as this would be the optimal strategy for group j. In the second
sub case a negotiated arrangement will prevail if high type members consti-
tute the majority in group j, while con
ict will emerge if they are a minority.
To summarize, we obtain:
Theorem 1. Let us consider the case where groups have the same size. The








1 + (n1)2  1][ then con
ict is the outcome of the game.





H 2 [ 1
n1[
p
1 + (n1)2   1];1[ then two sub cases can occur:
(a) if high type members constitute the majority in group 1, then a
cooperative agreement will prevail.
(b) Otherwise con













1 + (n2)2 1][ and then con









1 + (n2)2 1];1] and then a negotiated arrangement
will prevail if high type members constitute the majority in group
2, while con
ict will be the outcome of the game otherwise.
There are several interesting implications to the above result.
First, one might expect con
ict to be a frequent outcome of the game. More







ciently low or high then a negotiated agreement is not sustainable. This
implication was quite expected as con
ict will prevail as soon as at least one
party will nd it protable, while a negotiated agreement requires mutual
consent.







second case is symmetric once the role of each group is reversed. In such
a situation high type members of group i value the funding for local public
goods much more than high type members in group j, which increases the
incentives of high type members in group i to exert eorts to appropriate
the surplus. This increases the chance that group i will indeed appropriate
the surplus, which in turn increases the incentives for Low type members of
group i to choose con
ict as well. Thus all members of group i favor con
ict
over negotiation, and con
ict will prevail.
Second, the optimality of negotiated arrangements crucially depend on the
internal composition of the groups. Specically, if members with a high valu-
ation for (local) public goods constitute the majority in both groups, then a


















1 + (ni)2   1];
nj p
1 + (nj)2   1
]: (5)
The above condition depends obviously on the specic values of parameters
ni and nj, namely, the number of high type members in each group. In other
words, whether cooperative bargaining is optimal or not depends qualita-
tively on whether high type members constitute the majority in at least one
group or not. Then, provided it is the case, negotiation will emerge at the







The intuition is as follows. For intermediate values of this ratio the situ-
ation is balanced in that the valuations of the high type members in each
group are approximately the same. As such con
ict becomes less attractive







but below 1, the loss of surplus resulting from con
ict outweighs the poten-
tial gains for all members of group j, and for high type members of group i.
This decreases the incentives of high type members to exert eort in group i.
However, con
ict would still be preferable for low type members of group i
(the potential gain has decreased compared to the rst case, but they mostly
free ride during con
ict). As such for cooperative bargaining to occur it is
necessary that high type constitute the majority in group i.
224.2 The general case
Now we come back to the general case where the two groups may have dif-
ferent sizes. The next result will highlight the main dierence in such a
situation. Specically it becomes more complex as there is an added dimen-
sion, that is, whether the rst or second group is the largest one. This will
make the analysis more complex, as the description of the ranges over which
con
ict/negotiation is preferred will be less straightforward.
4.2.1 Con
ict or negotiated agreement?
From expressions (2) and (3) con
ict is protable for high type members of

















































Developping the above expression and simplifying, high type members of









































]  0: (6)








H +c; thus, we know
that the above inequality will never hold if
 = b









+ 1 < 0:
Second, provided that   0 then it can be checked that the following
conclusion holds:






































(negotiation is preferred over con
ict).
23Now it remains to assess the sign of . The rst thing to note is that  is
positive if the rst group is larger than the second one. Indeed, if n  m






 +1 > 0 since it is the sum of three positive terms.
Let us then consider that m > n; this is not sucient to ensure that 
be negative. More precisely, we must have
1
n1









 < 2, then the only case where the above inequality could
hold is n1 = 1. As this would depend on the specic value of the ratio
dis
 ,
we will assume instead that either the internal composition of group 1 or the
value of
dis
 is such that condition (7) does not hold. Thus, we consider from
now on that  is positive.
Let us now analyse the strategy of low type members in the rst group.
From expressions (2) and (4) con




































Developping the above expression and simplifying, low type members of




















Combining the conclusions obtained for the two types of agents, we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 4.2. In the general case (n 6= m) the situation can be described





























































[, then high type


















, then all members of group i prefer a
negotiated arrangement.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The qualitative implications of the above proposition are similar than in
the case of groups of identical size. However, there is an additional property
when groups have dierent sizes. It follows from inspection that the set of






for which a negotiated agreement is unanimously pre-
ferred within group i becomes larger compared to the case where groups have
the same size. More precisely, the lower bound of this set becomes smaller as
soon as n 6= m (this is obvious looking at the third case in proposition 2.4).
4.2.2 Characterization of the equilibrium set
Now we would like to check if the conclusions obtained in section hold in the
general case. For instance, it would be interesting to understand what would
happen if one group dominates the other in terms of its size. Would con
ict
be more likely to occur than in the benchmark case? From a general point of
view it is important to understand the specic in
uence of the relative size
of the groups. This is the aim of the present section.
Let us rst describe the outcome of the game. We can rely on the same
arguments than in the proof of Theorem 1 to obtain the following result:
Theorem 2. Let us consider the general case (n 6= m). The situation can
























ict is the outcome

































[ then two sub cases
can occur:
25(a) if high type members constitute the majority in group 1, then a
cooperative agreement will prevail.
(b) Otherwise con






































ict is the out-

































negotiated arrangement will prevail if high type members consti-
tute the majority in group 2, while con
ict will be the outcome of
the game otherwise;
























Proof. In the Appendix.
The qualitative implications of the general case are similar to those of
the case where groups have the same size for most cases. There is a notable
dierence, namely sub case 3, point c. When groups have dierent sizes there
now exists a set of situations where the optimality of negotiated agreements
does not depend on their internal composition. This set does not exist when
groups have the same size. This implies that in this sub case con
ict is less
likely to occur when groups do not have the same size or, in other words,
when groups are dierentiated by the negotiation protocol (as a function of
their relative sizes).
4.3 Comparative statics
We conclude the analysis by providing results of comparative statics regard-
ing the in
uence of the fundamentals of the problem on the range of situations
for which a negotiated agreement will prevail. We will provide separate re-
sults for the symmetric and general cases (because of the dierences in the
characterization of equilibria), and we will discuss potential implications.
264.3.1 The symmetric case
In the present sub section we will try to understand how the number of high
type members in each group in
uences the range of parameters over which
negotiated arrangements will prevail. To answer this question we now pro-
vide a few results of comparative statics.
The main result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4.3. Let us consider si and sj as dened in (5). Then we have
the following properties:
 si increases with an increase in the proportion of high type members in
group i (as measured by ni);
 sj decreases with an increase in the proportion of high type members in
group j (as measured by nj).
Proof. In the Appendix.
The above proposition has several interesting implications. Let us rst
consider that high type members constitute the majority in both groups. In







the interval [si;sj]. From proposition 2.5 we deduce that this interval shrinks
down as the number of high type members increases in either groups.
Let us focus on the case of group i. An increase in the number of high
type members in the other group has two opposite eects. On one side it
has a positive eect as it increases the probability that high type members
constitute the majority in group j, which increases the chance of a negoti-
ated agreement (which is preferred by group i). On the other side such an
increase has a negative eect on the size of interval [si;sj].
Now we move on to the general case, and we will check whether the above
qualitative properties continue to hold. Then we will provide some general
implications of the results.
4.3.2 The general case
We can use theorem 2 to characterize the set of situations where negotiated
agreements will prevail. We focus on the ideal case where high type members
constitute the majority in both groups. Then from points 2a), 3b) and 3c)




















































































We can provide interesting insights about the in
uence of the parameters of
the problem on the value of thi which in turn will enable us to assess the in-

uence of the internal composition and the relative size of each group, and of
the specication of the disagreement surplus dis, on the relative optimality
of negotiated agreements over con
ict.
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 4.4. The in
uence of the structural parameters of the game is
described below (where i 6= j):
 Threshold thi (i = 1;2) decreases with an increase in the value of the
disagreement surplus dis.
 It decreases as the size of group i increases.
 It increases as the size of group j increases.
 It increases as the number of high type members in group i increases.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Using proposition 3.4 we can now assess the in
uence of the structural
parameters on the optimality of negotiated agreements.
Lemma 4.1. We have the following results:
28 The interval (9) expands as the value of the disagreement surplus dis
increases.
 It shrinks down as the number of high type members in group i (i = 1;2)
increases.
 The eect of an increase in the size of one group is ambiguous.
Proof.  From the rst point in proposition 4.4 we know that an increase
in the value of the disagreement surplus dis will result in a decrease
of the value of the rst bound dening the interval (9). Moreover, the
upper bound is equal to 1
th2; as such one can immediately check4 that
an increase in the value of dis will result in an increase in the value of
the upper bound. This concludes the proof.
 From the last point in proposition 4.4 we know that an increase in the
number of high type members in group 1 will result in an increase in
the value of the lower bound dening the interval (9). An increase in
the number of high type members in group 2 will result in a decrease
in the value of the upper bound dening it. This concludes the proof.
 Finally, let us focus on the in
uence of an increase in n. The rst bound
dening (9) will then increase, and the second bound will decrease. This
concludes the proof of the lemma.
There are several implications following from the above result. First,
the eects of the disagreement surplus and of the proportion of high type
members (in each group) are clear. Increasing dis will contribute to mak-
ing negotiated arrangements more protable compared to con
ict, while the
eect will be exactly the opposite for an increase in the proportion of high
type members.
Second, it is not possible to sign the eect of an increase in the size of a
particular group. This is quite logical as such an increase has an opposite
eect on the payo secured by agents who have the same type but are mem-
bers of dierent groups. Thus, this aects the protability of negotiation
over con







From a general point of view we can conclude that the qualitative implications
of the benchmark case are reinforced in the general situation. Focusing on
the case of group i, theorem 2 and the above lemma suggest that:
 When nj  m
2 negotiated arrangements will be more likely (considering
the case of group i) as the number of high type members nj increases;
 When nj  m
2 + 1 then negotiated arrangements will be more likely as
the number of high type members is as small as possible.
This provides welfare implications on the internal composition of the groups
as negotiated arrangements are (socially) ecient. We can add the following























then it would be preferable that the number of high type members in group
i be as low as possible (this follows from inspection of the expressions of
payos used in the proof of proposition 3.4). Respectively, when the ratio is
suciently large (greater than
nj p
1+(nj)2 1) then it would be preferable that
the number of high type members in group j be as low as possible. Indeed
this would ensure that the interval over which negotiated arrangements would
prevail becomes as large as possible.
5 Conclusion
We consider a situation where a resource has to be allocated between dierent
groups whose members have either high or low valuation for the resource.
The (two) groups can either negotiate cooperatively or use con
ict to solve
the allocation problem. We show that the incentives to negotiate or to go to
war depend on the ratios of high type members' valuations. Specically, the
situation is described as follows:
 When the valuation of high type members in one group is suciently
small compared to that of the other group, con
ict will be optimal;




H the emergence of con
ict/negotiation
depends on the internal composition of group 1. If high type members












H is suciently low
or moderate (if and only if high type members do not constitute the
majority in group 2), otherwise negotiation becomes optimal.
Another implication of the analysis is that con
ict is more likely to emerge
when groups have the same size. We nally provide results of comparative
statics. Provided that high type members constitute the majority in both
groups, negotiation is less likely to emerge as the proportion of high type
members increases. This suggests that it would be important (for economic
eciency) to ensure that groups are balanced regarding their internal com-
position. Moreover, it seems that situations with groups of the same size are
more likely to promote con
ictual situations.
Even though the above analysis provides some interesting insights on the
in
uence of internal and external structures of groups on the emergence of
con
ict or negotiation, several extensions could (and should) be considered.
For instance, we assume that agents have complete information. Even though
the assumption that members of a given group have a reasonably good knowl-
edge of the characteristics of their own group makes sense in some situations,
it would be useful to analyse a situation where information about the group
characteristics is asymmetric. Moreover, we assume that the share of the
surplus secured by each group is used entirely to fund (strictly) local public
goods. In many real life situations, funds are likely to be divided between
private and public goods. It would be very interesting to extend the analysis
to such settings. We leave this for future work.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1






2]0;1[ implies that i
H  
j
H, which leads to the
conclusion that low type members of group i prefer con
ict over nego-









1 + (ni)2  1][
then high members of group i prefer con
ict as well. This concludes
the proof of the rst part of the proposition.
 It can be immediately checked that 1
ni[
p
1 + (ni)2   1] < 1 for any









1 + (ni)2   1];1[ high type




H low type members still prefer con
ict. This concludes







 1 > 1
ni[
p
1 + (ni)2   1] then high type members of




H, which means that low type members prefer a negotiated
arrangement. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2









































































 + 1 < ( 1
ni + 1)2 since n m
n+m
dis
 < 1 by
assumption. Now the proof follows from the same arguments than that of
proposition 2.3.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof of cases 1, 2, and 3 (sub cases a and b) follows from the
same arguments than that of theorem 1 and is thus omitted.




























































we know that all members of group 2 prefer a
negotiated agreement, which implies that both groups favor such an arrange-
























6.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof.  Using that si = 1
ni[
p
1 + (ni)2   1] and dierentiating with re-














1 + (ni)2f 1 +
p
1 + (ni)2g
which is positive for any non negative value of ni. This concludes the
proof of the rst part of the proposition.
 Using that sj =
nj p




















1 + (nj)2   1]2
which is negative for any non negative value of ni. This concludes the
proof of the proposition.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. In each case we come back to the expression of thi and we dierentiate
it with respect to the appropriate parameter.






























ni   1 < 0 for any ni at least equal to one, it is easily checked
that the numerator of the above expression is negative.

























ni   1 < 0 it is easily checked that the above expression is
negative.
























which is positive since 1




























































































































@ni > 0, which concludes the proof.
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